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As has been the rule for the last decade, the bulk of criminal
appellate activity has been concerned with questions of criminal pro-
cedure, rather than with substantive criminal law. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, which decides only criminal appeals,
has followed this pattern during its September 1968 term. For pur-
poses of review of the significant decisions handed down by this court,
the cases have been divided into these two categories.




As it has become almost routine for defense attorneys to allege,
on appeal, that the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona' have been violated
* This review covers only cases reported as of October 3, 1969.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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during the pre-trial interrogation of their clients, it is not surprising
that a large number of the cases decided by the court this term dealt
with such allegations. Of course, Miranda is no longer considered
either sensational or revoluntionary. Hence, the few decisions selected
for review which deal with the rules laid down in Miranda do not set
any radically new standards, but instead tend to involve subtleties
implicit in the established Miranda principles.
The case of Fowler v. State2 was one of the more sensational
decisions of the court this term, in that it effectively freed an admitted
rapist and murderer. Defendant was convicted of the first-degree
murder and rape of a nurse's aid, primarily on the basis of a statement
given by him to the police after several days of custodial interrogation.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court,
deciding that the confession should not have been admitted because
it violated defendant's fifth amendment right to remain silent and his
sixth amendment right to counsel.
The nurse's aid was murdered in November 1966. On March
25, 1967, defendant was arrested on an unrelated charge, about which
he was questioned on that day and the next. Prior to this interroga-
tion, defendant was advised of most of his Miranda rights.3 The
record did not indicate that defendant made any response to these
warnings. On the twenty-seventh, the police first questioned him con-
cerning the murder-rape case. Again the list of Miranda rights was
read to him, defendant giving no response. Defendant, although not
refusing to answer questions, repeatedly refused to discuss the murder-
rape. On the thirtieth, an attorney came to confer with defendant.
The evidence indicated that the attorney was brought into the small
interrogation room containing defendant and several officers, and that
the attorney was then allowed to talk with his new client, but only
while the officers themselves remained in the room, making an effec-
tive conference difficult if not impossible. The attorney left shortly,
and soon after his departure defendant confessed to having committed
the murder and rape, after which confession he signed a mimeographed
waiver of his Miranda rights.
The court's first decision was that defendant was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because the police did not allow him to
confer with his attorney in private. The court stated that to be effec-
tive the conference between a defendant and his counsel must not be
within the immediate presence of the police, although normal safe-
guards may be used for security purposes. Further, the court held
that when the assistance of counsel is denied in this manner during
interrogations, both the Miranda and Escobedo4 decisions dictate that
any statements given by defendant must be considered tainted and
inadmissible per se. Those two decisions require, of course, more
than the mere silence of defendant to evince a waiver of his constitu-
tional protection; in the absence of such a waiver, the denial of effec-
2. 6 Md. App. 651, 253 A.2d 409 (1969).
3. He was not told that he could end the interrogation at any time by expressing
a desire to thereafter remain silent.
4. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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tive assistance of counsel operates to make any inculpatory statement
violative of defendant's fifth amendment right to remain silent.
The court noted further that in deciding whether stationhouse
activity of the police deprived a defendant of the effective assistance
of counsel, the general atmosphere and background of the interroga-
tion must be evaluated. Here defendant's continual unwillingness to
discuss the murder-rape with the police, coupled with the latter's per-
sistence in trying to make defendant talk, indicated a lack of regard
for the dictates of Miranda. The court noted the failure of the police
to obtain a waiver from defendant until after he had confessed, saying
that for the waiver to be valid, it must be given prior to any custodial
interrogation, and closely subsequent to the reading of the Miranda
warnings.
In Franklin v. State,5 defendant was convicted in a non-jury
trial on two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon and on one
count of assault with intent to murder. The convictions as to one
count of robbery with a deadly weapon and assault with intent to
murder were affirmed, but the conviction on a second count of robbery
with a deadly weapon was reversed because it was based on an in-
criminating statement made by defendant without his having received
the proper Miranda warnings.
Defendant was questioned by the police on September 4, 5, and 6,
1967. He was given his Miranda warnings prior to questioning con-
ducted on the fourth, but was not given them at subsequent custodial
interrogations conducted on the fifth and sixth. It was on the sixth
that defendant made an incriminating statement which led to his
conviction on the second count of robbery with a deadly weapon.
This conviction was reversed on the ground that the Miranda warn-
ings given on the fourth were not alone sufficient to justify the accept-
ance as evidence of the incriminating statements made on the sixth.6
Thus the court has effectively required that if the State subjects
an accused to custodial interrogations on one day and on that day
gives him the Miranda warnings, and then on a later day questions
the accused again, the Miranda warnings must be repeated if state-
ments then obtained from the accused are to be admissible.7
Although the statements in question were offered for the purpose
of impeaching the accused's credibility rather than as substantive
evidence of his guilt, the court held that the Miranda exclusionary
rules still apply. The court summarized the rule applicable in such
cases thusly:
If the veracity of an accused testifying in his own behalf is to
be attacked by a prior inconsistent or contradictory statement
made while he was undergoing a custodial interrogation, the
State must affirmatively show that the statement was made after
5. 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d 487 (1969).
6. The charges of assault with intent to murder and robbery with a deadly
weapon were sustained because the conviction was based on evidence other than
appellant's incriminating statements made without the proper Miranda warnings.
7. See Brown v. State, 6 Md. App. 564, 252 A.2d 272 (1969).
8. 6 Md. App. at 578, 252 A.2d at 491.
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the accused had been fully advised of all of his rights and had
effectively waived them in accordance with the standards pre-
scribed in Miranda.'
This decision appears sound. The minor burden on interrogating
policemen created by a requirement that the Miranda warnings pre-
cede each day's questioning is more than balanced by the aid thereby
given an accused in recognizing and utilizing his constitutional rights,
and by the inherent tendency of such procedure to reduce police excesses.
Moreover, there seems to be no real distinction between the use of
statements as direct, incriminating evidence, and the use of such state-
ments to impeach exculpatory statements by defendant. The court has
merely refused to recognize any distinction and has quite reasonably
decided that the Miranda rules apply equally to both situations.0
Minor v. State" involved a situation in which a confession was
made by one defendant after his tearful and pregnant co-defendant
wife urged him to make one, saying that she had already done so
herself. Defendant had been read the Miranda warnings by the police,
had said that he understood them, and then made his confession.
Answering defendant's contention on appeal that his rights had been
violated by his wife's failure to give him the Miranda warnings when
she urged him to confess, the court held that defendant's constitutional
rights were not violated since the Miranda rules only apply to govern-
ment and law enforcement officers and not to private persons.
2. Extra-judicial and In-Court Identifications
The Court of Special Appeals had several occasions to consider
the implications of the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy of extra-judicial
identification rulings,'" and it was in this area that the body of the
court's significant criminal procedure decisions was rendered.
The principles of Wade-Gilbert-Stovall are by now firmly estab-
lished. Wade and Gilbert held that an accused is entitled to the assist-
ance of counsel at any pre-trial confrontation between the accused
and persons intended to be witnesses against him, when the purpose
of that confrontation is the identification of the accused as the per-
petrator of the crime. Denial (as defined by Miranda v. Arizona")
of this right requires the exclusion of all evidence pertaining to such
pre-trial identification, and further precludes the use of an in-court
9. Id. at 579, 252 A.2d at 491 ; accord, Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 478 (1963).
10. But see Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1953), concerning a trial for
the illegal possession of narcotics. Petitioner testified on direct examination that he
had never possessed any narcotics. On cross examination, to impeach his testimony,
the government introduced the testimony of an officer who had obtained heroin from
petitioner through an unlawful search and seizure, although the evidential use of this
previous search had been suppressed on petitioner's motion. The trial court admitted
the impeaching evidence with a limiting instruction to the jury. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that petitioner could not use the previous unlawful search as a
shield against his own untruths and that his testimony on direct examination opened
the door, for impeachment purposes, to evidence obtained through the unlawful search.
11. 6 Md. App. 82, 250 A.2d 113 (1969).
12. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967) ; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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identification by the same witness unless the State can show that the
in-court identification is based upon an untainted, independent source. 4
Stovall held that regardless of a right to counsel claim, an extra-judicial
identification may be so prejudicial as to be violative of fifth and
fourteenth amendment due process requirements. No exclusionary
rules were enunciated, however, for situations in which, as in Stovall
itself, only due process, and not the right to counsel was abridged.
Smith & Samuels v. State"5 held that the Wade-Gilbert ex-
clusionary rules apply to Stovall situations as well. The extra-judicial
identification of Smith by the victim in this case involved the use of
photographs ("mug-shots") of large numbers of people, from which
the victim selected Smith as his assailant. The extra-judicial identifi-
cation of Samuels stemmed from the victim's viewing of a single
photograph shown him by a policeman at the scene of the crime. The
policeman had the picture with him only because he was investigating
an unrelated crime, and showed it to the victim apparently on a mere
hunch. While Smith was later identified by the victim at a lineup,
Samuels was not. Both were subsequently identified by the victim at
trial. As the victim had been forced to remain in an automobile for
two and one-half hours with defendants, and had thus observed them
closely for an extended period, the trial judge denied defendants'
motion to exclude the extra-judicial and in-court identifications be-
cause, in the opinion of the court, the State was able to show sufficiently
that the in-court identifications were not necessarily based on the
pre-trial showing of the photographs, but could have been based on
the victim's independent observation while the crime was in progress.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, using similar reasoning, and
in the process decided that the extra-judicial identifications were not,
in any event, tainted. Thus their exposition of an exclusionary rule is
dictum, but is nevertheless an important addition to the rules govern-
ing criminal process in Maryland. The very fact that Stovall was
applied to an identification by the use of photographs is significant;
the court held that only Wade and Gilbert, because of their peculiar
concern with the right to counsel, need be restricted to personal con-
frontations between the accused and his identifier, while the fact that
due process may be violated even outside the accused's presence
requires Stovall protection in those situations as well. 6
The court also discussed the question of whether the trial court,
once it has ruled favorably on the admissibility of an in-court identifi-
cation, must submit this question to review by the trier of fact.
Because of the modus operandi of the exclusionary rules, such a sub-
mission is not proper, since once the trial court has decided that the
in-court identification is admissible regardless of the legality of the
14. Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969), held that Wade and
Gilbert apply to pre-indictment, as well as to post-indictment confrontations.
15. 6 Md. App. 59, 250 A.2d 285 (1969).
16. This is of course in accord with Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
384 (1967), which held that: ". . . convictions based on eyewitness identification at
trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground
only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as
to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."
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extra-judicial identification, evidence of the latter is immaterial and its
admission will only result in a reversal of the conviction, since such
evidence is to be excluded. 7
Despite the extensive black-letter law treatment of the rules
governing extra-judicial and in-court identifications of accused per-
sons, treatment which suggests a strict adherence to the spirit of
Wade-Gilbert-Stovall's concern with the possibility of unreasonably
suggestive identification situations, the Court of Special Appeals' appli-
cation of these rules has occasionally left some questions unanswered
as to how strictly the rules are to be applied, and in what situations.
Two areas of concern have developed in the court's handling of some
of the extra-judicial identification cases before it this term. First,
there have been at least two cases where the court has found that, on
the facts, the exclusionary rules did not apply, in part because the
identification alleged to have been tainted was not one arranged or
planned by the police, but rather occurred "by accident and by chance,"'"
at the police station. While truly chance identifications should not be
subject to exclusionary rules, it is in defining what constitutes a chance
identification that the difficulty lies. The fact that the police did not
in fact intend a confrontation is often immaterial if the circumstances
of the place of identification, e.g., a stationhouse, are themselves sug-
gestive. 9 And yet the court this term at least twice relied upon the
"happenchance-design" argument when supporting a decision allowing
evidence of such identifications to be admitted.
In Smith v. State,20 the victim of an armed robbery was told to
go to the stationhouse to identify a man suspected of the crime. While
there, he was sent to a room by a desk sergeant; at the door of this
room he met his own supervisor, who told him to look through a
window in the door. Inside the room was a group of men composed
of police officers in uniform, other men in plain clothes, and Smith,
whom the victim immediately identified as his assailant. Although
the Court of Special Appeals held that this was not an "unnecessarily
suggestive" confrontation, arguing that it ". . did not occur at the
direct instance of the police, nor were they a party to it" and thatIf '*the manner in which the victim viewed the appellant was more
by happenchance than design,"21 it would seem that the presence of a
man in a stationhouse room full of policemen, to which room the
victim is directed, is not unsuggestive merely because the confrontation
was not arranged. The court's statement that Wade's indication "that
only those pre-trial confrontations that are not subject to fair and
17. The Court of Special Appeals has taken a similar approach to determinations
by the trial court that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search-arrest
warrant based on information obtained from an informer. Price v. State, 7 Md. App.
131, 254 A.2d 219 (1969), discussed infra p. 287.
18. Watson v. State, 7 Md. App. 225, 238, 255 A.2d 103, 110 (1969).
19. Conversely, the fact that the police "designed" to effectuate a confrontation is
likewise immaterial if the situation itself is not suggestive.
20. 6 Md. App. 23, 249 A.2d 732 (1969).
21. Id. at 29-30, 249 A.2d at 736-37. The court concluded that a "confrontation,"
to be within the meaning of Wade, must be conducted at the instance of the police, or
at least the police must be a party to it.
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meaningful objective review later at the trial fall within its strictures"22
does not really support its "happenchance-design" distinction, since
the objective reviewability of such confrontations is in no way depend-
ent on the intentions of the police.
In Watson v. State,2 3 the "happenchance-design" argument was
again used by the court, although in this case with different results.
Here the accused was at the police station when the victim of the
crime came to the station at the invitation of the police and saw the
accused standing with an officer. She identified him as her attacker.
In holding that this was a prejudicial confrontation, the court stressed
that, on the evidence, the police probably procured the confrontation
which, in any case, was a one-to-one viewing and therefore, by its
very nature, extremely suggestive. 4
Watson also contained arguments which constitute the second
apparent dilution of the effectiveness of rules governing extra-judicial
and in-trial identification. The accused lived in the same neighborhood
as the victim of the rape; the latter, while not knowing him personally,
was familiar enough with his face to be reasonably sure of his identity
as her assailant. Thus, regardless of the validity of the extra-judicial
identification of defendant at the police station, the State had the
required independent source upon which to base an in-court identifica-
tion, and need not have introduced evidence of the extra-judicial
viewing. However, the State did so, and was upheld by the trialjudge. Hence the Court of Special Appeals had to decide whether the
admission of evidence of the pre-trial viewing was harmless error under
Chapman v. California.25 The State, in arguing the harmless nature
of the error, suggested that since the victim had known defendant
prior to the extra-judicial identification, confrontation merely served
to confirm what she had already told them. The court would not
accept this argument, but apparently only because there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support it ;26 the inference being that in the proper
case such an argument would be effective. And yet to sustain such a
contention is to do away with the rule that evidence of tainted extra-judicial identification is inadmissible, regardless of whether an inde-
pendent source can be shown. The reason for the inadmissibility rule
appears sound: to avoid the use of unreliable evidence. Therefore any
deviation from the rule is a retreat to "law of the case" in which the
court attempts an analysis of the motives of a confrontation which
often occurred months before trial, and which was subject to no
judicial supervision.
In Bailey v. State,27 the court discussed the effects of a failure
to make a timely objection to an in-court identification. The court
first established that, under Rules 725(b) and 522(d) (2), made appli-
cable to criminal cases by Rule 725(f), a motion to exclude or sup-
press evidence must be made either before or during trial, and an
22. Id. at 29, 249 A.2d at 737.
23. 7 Md. App. 225, 255 A.2d 103 (1969).
24. Cf. Coit v. State, 7 Md. App. 70, 253 A.2d 526 (1969).
25. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
26. 7 Md. App. at 239, 255 A.2d at 111.
27. 6 Md. App. 496, 252 A.2d 85 (1969).
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objection must be made as soon after the introduction of the evidence
as grounds for objection become apparent, or the objection is deemed
to have been waived. Noting the practical effect of such a waiver, the
court stated that it meant that the exclusionary rules of Wade-Gilbert-
Stovall did not apply, and that the State was not required, therefore,
to introduce evidence of the extra-judicial identification for the pur-
pose of demonstrating the validity of the in-court identification.
3. Probable Cause for Arrest Based upon the
Statements of Informants
In Price v. State,28 defendant was convicted of violating Mary-
land's anti-abortion statute, primarily upon evidence seized by the
police from his automobile. A warrant had been issued for the search
of the automobile, based upon the information contained in two
affidavits. The primary affidavit was of a policeman, Rossi, who
related certain information given to him by three named informants,
information which was either the product of their direct observation,
or information constituting the "underlying circumstances" of their
assertions. There was no direct statement in Rossi's affidavit as to
the reliability or credibility of these informants. However, it was
evident from both his own direct investigations of the crime, and from
the mutual support which each of the informant's versions gave the
others, that the information given him was accurate. At trial, the
defendant moved to suppress the evidence, the denial of which motion
precipitated the question before the Court of Special Appeals. The
court held that Rossi's affidavit and the secondary affidavit of another
police officer who claimed to believe Rossi's conclusions were enough
to constitute the probable cause necessary to make a warrant valid
under Supreme Court rulings in Spinelli v. United States,2" McCray
v. Illinois,"0 and Draper v. United States."'
Spinelli has recently re-affirmed the established Supreme Court
position that a prima facie demonstration of criminal behavior is not
essential to the probable cause necessary for a valid search warrant
or arrest warrant, as long as "probability" of the existence of such
behavior is shown. 2 While the word "probability" as a definition of
"probable cause" appears to have limited utility, the Court of Special
Appeals explained their interpretation by a discussion of the principles
enunciated in Aguilar v. Texas.33 This case held that when an appli-
cation for a search-arrest warrant is based upon an informant's tip,
the application must contain: (1) the "underlying circumstances" or
allegations of the informant, to enable the magistrate authorizing the
warrant to independently determine whether a crime has probably been
committed, and (2) some basis for the applicant's faith in the credi-
28. 7 Md. App. 131, 254 A.2d 219 (1969).
29. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
30. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
31. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
32. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964), quoted by the Court of Special Appeals
in Price.
33. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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bility of the informant, i.e., the way in which the information was
obtained or some corroborating factual matter."4 If the informant's
tip itself is not sufficiently supported by either of these requirements,
independent corroborating evidence is essential in order to enable the
magistrate to use the tip as even a partial basis for granting a war-
rant. In Price, the informants included one actual instigator of the
crime and the information which they provided was deemed by the
court to have been satisfactory under both criteria.
Having determined that the trial judge ruled correctly on the
motion to suppress, the court next considered whether, under Rule
729, such a determination of admissibility by the judge must be sub-
mitted to the jury. The court decided that while evidence as to the
admissibility of articles seized by warrant, i.e., evidence as to the
legality of the warrant, must be heard out of the jury's presence,
unlike evidence as to the admissibility of a challenged confession, the
court's decision that the evidence is admissible need not then be sub-
mitted to the jury for redetermination. Although the Court of Special
Appeals refused to decide whether the admissibility of evidence seized
without a warrant must likewise be submitted to the jury subsequent
to a preliminary determination by the judge that it is admissible, the
answer to this question is probably negative, as is the implication of
the case next discussed, since the rationale seems to be that the ad-
missibility of evidence of probable cause is a matter of law, while the
issue of the voluntariness of a confession is a matter of fact.
5
Winebrenner v. State36 involved a similar situation, except that
in this case the arrest was made without a warrant.3 7 Defendant was
arrested and convicted of the illegal sale of amphetamines. The arrest
34. A mere assertion of the informant's past percentage of accuracy is not suffi-
cient, according to Aquilar.
35. The trial court initially granted, at the close of the State's evidence, defend-
ant's motion of acquittal as to one count. Immediately the State objected that, contrary
to the judge's belief, the counts were not inconsistent and that defendant could be
convicted of both, whereupon the judge reversed his decision and denied the motion.
On appeal, defendant argued that once the motion was granted the trial ended as to
that count and thus to reverse the motion was to place defendant in double jeopardy.
The Court of Special Appeals called this harmless error, and said that this did not
effect the trial's fairness. Since defendant was not convicted of the count, the decision
was harmless; it is only interesting in that, in passing, the court noted that following
the reversal of the motion, defendant offered evidence, thereby, according to the court,
withdrawing his motion for acquittal under Rule 755(b). This was apparently in-
cluded to add weight to the court's decision. But it should not add weight to this
decision, since, first, evidence had to be offered on the other count anyway since the
motion had not been granted even initially for its dismissal, and more importantly,
second, whether or not the motion was deemed to have been "withdrawn," does not
affect the issue of whether the motion, once granted, could be reversed and denied.
Obviously, upon the reversal, defendant had little choice but to offer his own case,
and this action should not be viewed as somehow rectifying the mistake of the trial
judge. The court seemed to suggest that by defendant's offering evidence the prior
issue of reversal was in some way mooted. On this reasoning, defendant would be
forced into an election as to whether to stand on his objection to the reversal and
rest his case, or to waive the objection in order to present a case. The fact that at
the conclusion of his case he could again move for acquittal has no bearing on the
issue of the court's mistake as to the first motion. To force defendant to take such
a gamble is contrary to the intent of the Rules, which long ago did away with the
necessity of an election at the end of the State's case.
36. 6 Md. App. 440, 251 A.2d 610 (1969).
37. The standard of probable cause is, of course, the same for arrests with and
without warrants.
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and subsequent search were based upon information that the police
received by a telephone call made by one Eckloff.38 Evidence as to
the contents of the telephone conversation was excluded as hearsay
at the trial level; despite this exclusion, the trial court found the war-
rantless arrest to be valid and therefore admitted all evidence obtained
from the subsequent search and seizure."0 On appeal, the conviction
was reversed and remanded on the ground that evidence of the contents
of the telephone conversation should have been admitted to establish
whether or not there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest.40
The Court of Special Appeals held that since no evidence was
offered to show that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe
that a felony had been committed, or that the accused had committed
it, the arrest was not valid.4 Therefore, it was prejudicial error to
admit any evidence which was seized as a result of the invalid arrest.42
The court maintained that for the arrest to be held valid, it must have
been shown that the information which the arresting officer relied
upon was such as to justify a warrantless arrest. In order for this to
be done, the contents of the telephone conversation between Eckloff
and the police would have had to be admitted as evidence. The
court noted that:
We emphasize that on the issues of probable cause and the lawful-
ness of arrest and of the admissibility of evidence obtained through
any search made in connection with the arrest, information upon
which the police officer acted, even if hearsay, is directly relevant
and is admissible. 4
In effect, what the court did was to require admission of evi-
dence which, if offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted, would
be hearsay, not as direct evidence going to the issue of guilt, but
as evidence bearing on the determination of whether the police officer
had the requisite probable cause to make such an arrest. The court
stipulated, however, that any such evidence should be heard out of
the jury's presence, when the trial is by jury. Implicit in this state-
ment is the opinion that the jury should not be allowed to pass on
the admissibility of such evidence following the judge's determination.
38. Charles Eckloff called the police and reported to them that defendant hadjust tried to sell him a "little black" pill. The police advised him to buy the pill with
marked bills, and that they would come immediately to make an arrest. 6 Md. App.
at 444, 251 A.2d at 613.
39. The trial court relied on the rule that if an arrest is valid, a search and seizure
incident thereto is reasonable and all evidence so obtained is properly admissible.
McRae v. State, 3 Md. App. 388, 239 A.2d 607 (1968) ; Hutchinson v. State, 1 Md.
App. 362, 230 A.2d 352 (1967).
40. And therefore, whether or not the subsequent warrantless search and seizure
were also valid. A warrantless arrest by a police officer is valid where he has probable
cause to believe at the time of the arrest that a felony has been committed and that
the arrestee has committed it (or that a misdemeanor is being committed in his pres-
ence by the arrestee). Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515, 243 A.2d 879 (1968).
41. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) ; Colopietro v. State, 5 Md. App. 312,
246 A.2d 773 (1968).
42. See McCarthy v. State, 2 Md. App. 400, 234 A.2d 767 (1967) ; Randolph v.
State, I Md. App. 441, 230 A.2d 688 (1967).
43. 6 Md. App. at 446-47, 251 A.2d at 614.
44. Id. at 443, 251 A.2d at 612.
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As a practical matter, the court has thus provided a rationale under
which it will be possible to have certain types of information admitted
as evidence even though they would normally constitute hearsay, when
the trial is by a judge rather than by a jury.
4. Search and Seizure Incident to a Lawful Arrest
Scott v. State4 5 involved a conviction of defendant for possession
of heroin, based primarily upon evidence seized, not from defendant's
person, from his "immediate possession," or from the area of his
"immediate control,"46 but rather from another room of the premises
in which he was arrested. Defendant moved to quash this evidence,
claiming that to admit it would violate his right to be free of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. The denial of this motion precipitated
the appeal.
The Supreme Court has recently held, in Chimel v. California,47
that the rule, until then followed,4" that a search and seizure of the
premises is valid when incidental to a lawful arrest, is no longer a
sufficient protection of the citizen's right against unreasonable search
and seizure. Rather, a warrantless search and seizure accompanying
a valid arrest may now extend only to the arrestee's person and to
the area within the arrestee's "immediate control."49 A search of other
areas without a warrant is prohibited, and any evidence seized thereby
is rendered inadmissible.
Chimel was decided on June 23, 1969. Defendant was arrested
pursuant to a warrant on June 4, 1968. As the evidence seized and
admitted against him was not tainted under pre-Chimel standards,
but would be so tainted if adjudged by the Chintel rule, the issue before
the Court of Special Appeals was whether Chimel was to be applied
retroactively. This question was not resolved by the Supreme Court
in Chimel. Presumably it will be called upon to do so in the near
future, and the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, refusing to
apply the rule retroactively, will stand or fall with that decision.
Until that time, at least, Chimel will not be applied retroactively
in Maryland. The reasoning upon which the court based its lengthy
opinion appears sound. These exclusionary rules adopted by the
Supreme Court during recent years have been applied only prospec-
tively,5" since as curbs on police practices they could only affect the
conduct of future searches and seizures. There is no reason to treat
the rule announced in Chimel any differently; to do so would merely
necessitate the re-trial of thousands of convicted persons, imposing a
burden on the judicial system which would not be offset by any change
45. 7 Md. App. 505, __- A.2d ___ (1969).
46. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Gross v. State, 235 Md. 429, 201
A.2d 808 (1964).
47. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
48. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
49. The search of the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control
are permitted to guard against the use of concealed weapons and to locate any destruc-
table evidence on the arrestee's person.
50. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1966).
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in procedure for searches which were made in the past when no such
rule existed.
5. Illegal Fingerprinting as Constituting a Violation
of Fourth Amendment Protections
The decision in July v. State5 is noteworthy primarily in that
the same subject was treated by the Supreme Court less than one
month later in Davis v. Mississippi.52 In July, the Court of Special
Appeals stated, in dictum, that the fingerprinting of one illegally
arrested did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination under
the fifth amendment because, under the test established in Schmerber
v. California,53 fingerprints are considered to be real or physical evi-
dence rather than evidence of a communicative nature. However, the
court suggested that the fingerprinting of one illegally arrested may
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment, and would therefore be subject to exclusion under Mapp
v. Ohio.54 In Davis the Supreme Court followed this reasoning, hold-
ing that fingerprint evidence taken after an illegal arrest may not be
introduced at the trial of the accused.
B. In-Court Procedure
There were three significant decisions by the Court of Special
Appeals pertaining to procedures to be followed during the actual trial
of an accused. The three cases deal with separate questions of law.
In Poling v. State,5 defendant, convicted of murder in the second
degree, contended on appeal that the trial judge had committed re-
versible error in allowing a co-defendant to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination. The co-defendant had been called as a witness for
the defense but had refused to testify.
The Court of Special Appeals noted that in Butz v. State,5" the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is personal to the witness and that defendant has no standing
to assert error on appeal if the witness is compelled to testify and
the testimony implicates defendant.5 7 However, the Court of Special
Appeals distinguished that factual situation, noting that the present
issue was whether defendant had standing to object when he was
51. 6 Md. App. 409, 251 A.2d 384 (1969).
52. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
53. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
54. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
55. 6 Md. App. 45, 250 A.2d 126 (1969).
56. 221 Md. 68, 156 A.2d 423 (1959).
57. In Chesapeake Club v. State, 63 Md. 446 (1885), the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that it was error to compel a witness to testify after he had personally
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. The court granted the corporate
defendant a new trial without stating any other reason for the reversal. The court
in Butz noted Chesapeake and stated that ". . . insofar as that case is to be construed
as a general holding to the effect that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a
new trial because privileged, though material, testimony of a witness, who is not a
party, has been admitted in evidence, we decline to follow the same." 221 Md. at 73-74,
156 A.2d at 426.
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denied the testimony of a witness called in his behalf.58  The court,
citing the Maryland Declaration of Rights,5" held that it is a funda-
mental principle that a defendant has a right to examine the witnesses
for and against him and therefore defendant had standing to object
when denied this right by the witnesses' invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination.
After deciding that defendant had standing to challenge the right
of the witness to invoke the privilege, the court was faced with the
question of whether the privilege was properly invoked or whether
it had been waived by the witness. Defendant argued that, by plead-
ing guilty to a charge of assault, the witness had waived his right to
claim the privilege."0 The court, however, reasoned that since ten
other counts in the witnesses' indictment which had been stetted by
the State had not merged with the charge of assault, the witness was
still liable to prosecution as to those counts. The fact that the witness
was liable to prosecution for related counts made his invocation of
the privilege against self-incrimination proper and therefore sustain-
able against the challenge of defendant.
In Suggs v. State,"' defendant, who was found guilty of armed
robbery, contended that allowing the State's Attorney to inquire on
cross-examination as to a prior conviction for armed robbery consti-
tuted a denial of due process of law. The contention was based on
the fact that at the time of the trial the prior conviction was pending
on appeal and was in fact subsequently reversed.
The Court of Special Appeals recognized that defendant's credi-
bility as a witness was vital and that his impeachment by evidence of
the prior conviction was harmful to his defense. Nevertheless, the
court adopted the apparent majority rule and held that the introduc-
tion of such evidence only constituted reversible error when the prior
conviction was presumptively void on its face. The court noted that
defendant's prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained in viola-
tion of his privilege against self-incrimination, but held that this did
not make the conviction presumptively void. In support of this posi-
tion the court cited cases stating that the law presumes that a jury
would not find an accused guilty upon mere suspicion or accusation
and that it is the verdict of the jury in the prior case that affects
the credibility of the witness, regardless of the subsequent reversal
of that verdict.6
58. In Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 204 A.2d 500 (1964), the same factual situa-
tion arose. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the propriety of the
witnesses' invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination without discussing
whether the appellant had standing to object.
59. "That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to examine
the witnesses for and against him on oath .. MD. CONST. art. 21.
60. In Knox v. State, 234 Md. 203, 198 A.2d 285 (1964), the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that a witness who has pleaded guilty waives his right to claim privilege
because the prosecution is over.
61. 6 Md. App. 231, 250 A.2d 670 (1969).
62. In discussing the question of when a prior conviction would be presumed void,
the court cited Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) and People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.
2d 204, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1967). In each of these cases it clearly
appeared from the face of the record that defendant had not been represented by
counsel in the prior conviction, which nevertheless was presumptively valid on its face.
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Phillips v. State 3 involved a question of in-court citation of
authority. Defendant's counsel, in arguing before a jury as to the
applicable statutory sanction for walking away from a "work-release"
assignment, sought to refer to a prior nisi prius decision involving
the same question. 4 The trial court refused to allow such reference
to be made.
On appeal the Court of Special Appeals noted that in Maryland
jurors are the judges of law as well as of fact and that it is permissible
for counsel to refer, in their arguments, to textbooks as well as to
opinions of the Maryland Court of Appeals and the Court of Special
Appeals.65 However, as no opinions of the Maryland Court of Appeals
or the Court of Special Appeals dealt directly with the issues involved,
the court held that counsel should be allowed to refer to all relevant
authority which existed in the state at the time of the trial. As a
condition to this broad citation right, the court required that counsel
identify the decision by the name of the case, the court of decision,
the date of decision, and the presiding judge. The court also noted
that the trial judge may express a different view of the law to the
jury without committing reversible error, since it is the jury's function
to determine which should be followed.6"
In two significant decisions, the court defined the State's power
to obtain appellate review of a lower court's acquittal, or action tanta-
mount to an acquittal, of a defendant. One limitation of the power to
appeal was imposed on constitutional grounds; the other was framed
in statutory terms.
State v. Campbell & Reeves67 held that the recent Supreme Court
decision in Benton v. Maryland,6" which for the first time made the fifth
amendment's guarantee of freedom from double jeopardy applicable
to the states under the fourteenth amendment, prohibited the State
from appealing acquittals, entered by a trial magistrate, to a county
circuit court. Benton had overruled the longstanding decision in Palko
v. Connecticut,69 which had held that the double jeopardy clause was
not one of those rights made available to defendants in state actions by
the fourteenth amendment. Because the decision in Campbell was
couched in constitutional terms, the court did not pass on the question
of the extent to which Article 5, Section 30 of the Maryland Code
allows such an appeal; the court merely noted that to the extent that
this section does authorize such an appeal, it is unconstitutional.
The court noted that the double jeopardy prohibition, as applied
in Benton, only barred a second prosecution when "[t]he first prose-
cution involves a trial before a court having jurisdiction and em-
powered to impose punishment by way of a fine, imprisonment, or
63. 6 Md. App. 56, 250 A.2d 111 (1969).
64. In State v. Barton, No. 34130 (Cir. Ct., Baltimore Co., May 1, 1968), the
same judge, sitting without a jury, had reached a decision on the identical question.
65. Brown v. State, 222 Md. 290, 159 A.2d 844 (1959); Jackson v. State, 180
Md. 658, 26 A.2d 815 (1942).
66. Wilson v. State, 239 Md. 245, 210 A.2d 824 (1964) ; Schanker v. State, 208
Md. 15, 116 A.2d 363 (1954).
67. 7 Md. App. 538, ____ A.2d - (1969).
68. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
69. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
otherwise as a deterrent to the commission of crime ... ."0 Thus,
in a case where there has been no trial on the merits, there is no possi-
bility of double jeopardy; for this reason the State may still appeal,
under Article 5, Section 14, "from a final order or judgment granting
a motion to dismiss, or quashing or dismissing any indictment, in-
formation, presentment or inquisition in a criminal action."'"
Campbell and Benton still leave the State with an ability, albeit
restricted, to appeal a decision of a lower court which prevented the
conviction of a defendant. However, the right of appeal is purely
statutory in nature, and thus is controlled by the language of the
statute, in addition to constitutional limitations. In State v. Mather,2
the court denied an appeal by the State from the lower court's grant-
ing of defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence. The motion,
based upon a violation of defendant's fourteenth amendment rights,
was granted following a pretrial hearing on the issue; the State
appealed the decision, and defendant moved to dismiss the appeal
because it was not from a final judgment and therefore not within
the jurisdiction of an appellate court.
The Court of Special Appeals agreed. The controlling statute is
Article 5, Section 14, which reads:
The State may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from
a final order or judgment granting a motion to dismiss, or quash-
ing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment or
inquisition in a criminal action, but the State shall have no right
of appeal in any criminal action where the defendant has been
tried and acquitted.
Under the language of this section the State clearly is not em-
powered to appeal anything but a final order or judgment in a case
wherein defendant has not been tried and acquitted. Thus the court
has no jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the granting of a pre-
trial motion to suppress evidence.
The effect of this decision is to make the trial court's decision
or a motion to suppress evidence non-reviewable in many cases. If
evidence is erroneously suppressed, and the State is thereby prevented
from meeting its burden of proof, defendant will be acquitted; once
acquitted, defendant is safe from an appeal by the State from the sup-
pression of the evidence. Paradoxically, it would seem that if the
suppressed evidence constitutes such a preponderance of the State's
case that no trial is held, and the indictments are dismissed, the State
retains a right to appeal because there would then be a final order or
judgment. The court noted that "If a broader right to review
is necessary in the interest of criminal justice, it must be granted by
the legislature." 3
70. 7 Md. App. at 540-41, __ A.2d at -.
71. Id. at 542 n.3, - A.2d at .
72. 7 Md. App. 549, __ A.2d __ (1969).
73. Id. at 552, __ A.2d at _
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C. Post-Trial Procedure
1. The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 74 was the subject
of the decision in Sample v. Warden,75 in which the Court of Special
Appeals considered a convicted person's right to raise, for the first
time, the issue of incompetency of counsel, on an application for post-
conviction relief. The applicant in Sample had been convicted of first
degree murder in 1963, which conviction was affirmed by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals in 1964.76 The applicant then filed a timely
petition under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, raising
the contention, inter alia, that he was not adequately represented by
counsel. After a hearing on the petition, relief was denied by the
lower court, petitioner being adequately represented by an attorney at
the hearing. No application for leave to appeal this decision was filed.
Nearly three years later, the applicant filed a new petition for
relief under the Act, again alleging, inter alia, incompetency of counsel.
This second petition was dismissed without a hearing. The judge held
that the incompetency of counsel assertion had been "finally litigated"
within the meaning of Section 645A(b) of the Act, when the first
petition for relief was denied. An application for leave to appeal the
decision denying this second petition was filed.
The Court of Special Appeals granted the application. In doing
so they necessarily found (1) that petitioner's allegation of incom-
petency of counsel had not been "finally litigated" by the denial of the
first petition, and (2) that the issue had not been waived, within the
meaning of Section 645A(c) of the Act, by the failure to file an
application for leave to appeal that first denial.
The decision that applicant's first allegation of inadequacy of
counsel had not been "finally litigated" was clearly governed by the
language of Section 645A(b), which states that:
For the purposes of this subtitle, an-allegation of error shall be
deemed to be finally litigated when the Court of Appeals or Court
of Special Appeals has rendered a decision on the merits thereof,
either upon direct appeal or upon any consideration of an appli-
cation for leave to appeal filed pursuant to § 645-I of this sub-
title; or when a court of original jurisdiction, after a full and
fair hearing, has rendered a decision on the merits thereof upon
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a writ of error coram
nobis, unless said decision upon the merits of such petition is
clearly erroneous.
Thus the decision really turned on whether defendant's failure to
apply for leave to appeal the earlier denial constituted a waiver under
Section 645A(c), at least under the reasoning of the court.
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645A-J (1967).
75. 6 Md. App. 103, 250 A.2d 269 (1969).
76. Sample v. State, 235 Md. 554, 201 A.2d 797 (1964).
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Section 645A(c) states:
For the purposes of this subtitle, an allegation of error shall be
deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have made, but in-
telligently and knowingly failed to make, such allegation before
trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not said petitioner
actually took such an appeal), in any habeas corpus or coram
nobis proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, in a prior
petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually
instituted by said petitioner, unless the failure to make such allega-
tion shall be excused because of special circumstances. The burden
of proving the existence of such special circumstances shall be
upon the petitioner.
A careful reading of this section in relation to the facts of this
case shows that, technically, defendant fits into none of the enumerated
situations which constitute a waiver of an allegation of error. Cate-
gorically, it could not have been raised prior to trial, and there was
no habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding. Of the remaining enum-
erated situations, those of "at trial" and "on direct appeal" must be
treated as one, since the Court of Special Appeals has consistently
refused to consider on appeal an allegation of inadequacy of counsel
which has not been first raised at trial. Although defendant could
have made his claim at trial, the court said that Galloway v. Warden77
held, by implication, that such a claim does not have to be made at
trial in order to be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief. Nor
did petitioner fail to raise the issue in his prior petition. Finally, he
initiated no "other proceeding." Using this method of exclusion, the
court determined that defendant had eluded all of the waiver situations
and thus could properly assert his claim in the second petition. The
significant holdings in this opinion are, first, that the issue need not
be raised at trial to be preserved for a post-conviction relief petition,
and second, that a failure to apply for leave to appeal does not con-
stitute a waiver.
The first appears to be a sound policy decision, a reasonable
exception to the rule announced by the Maryland Court of Appeals
in Lomax v. Warden7 that a claim not made in the lower court will
not be considered on an application for leave to appeal. To require
petitioner to have raised the issue of incompetency of counsel at the
trial level in order to preserve the allegation for a petition under the
Act would seriously hamper a defendant's ability to assert such a
claim, since the burden of allegation at the trial level would pre-
sumably fall upon the shoulders of the very counsel whose inadequacy
defendant alleges, and who, therefore, could not be counted on to
raise the issue, and since the inadequate representation may have come
after the trial. Since defendant is not allowed to initially raise the
77. 2 Md. App. 467, 235 A.2d 309 (1967).
78. 232 Md. 657, 194 A.2d 269 (1963).
[VOL. XXIX
1969] REVIEW OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS 297
issue on direct appeal, 9 he should be given some legitimate oppor-
tunity to allege inadequate representation.
The second holding seems to stem from faulty logic. While it is
true, as the court painstakingly found, that petitioner's "allegation of
error" had not been waived under the statute, it may be argued that
what was actually being dealt with was not a waiver of the allegation
of error, but was, rather, a waiver of his right to apply for leave to
appeal. The statute makes no provision for such a waiver; it merely
says that for any of the enumerated classes of errors, a convicted
person "may institute a proceeding under this subtitle . . .provided
the alleged error has not been previously and finally litigated or
waived . . . ." It would seem that the key word is "institute" and as
long as the allegation of error has neither been waived nor finally
litigated, petitioner may assert the error. Petitioner in fact exercised
his right to institute a proceeding under the Act, which is the only
right given him by the statute. It would seem that his failure to
pursue this right to final litigation reasonably constitutes a waiver
under general principles of law. This argument seems to be supported
by Section 645-I, which allows petitioner thirty days in which to apply
for leave to appeal.
2. Defective Delinquency
In Mullen v. Director,"0 the applicant pleaded guilty to second-
degree murder and was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment. He
was thereafter committed to Patuxent Institution for examination and,
after a report by staff members at Patuxent followed by a jury trial,
was confined to the Institution for an indefinite period. Mullen then filed
a petition to have his defective delinquency status redetermined. From
the trial judge's denial of his petition, he applied for leave to appeal.
One committed to Patuxent Institution as a defective delinquent
cannot properly file a petition for redetermination until he has been
confined for two years after the commitment and has been confined
for "a total period, including any period of confinement under his
original sentence prior to commitment ...equal to two thirds of his
original sentence."81 Mullen had satisfied the first requirement, but
had not been confined for two-thirds of his original sentence. He was
apparently entitled to credits for hard work and/or good behavior.
In denying the application, the court found no merit in the
applicant's contention that allowances relating to hard work and/or
good behavior should be considered in computing the expiration date
of his sentence. The court found nothing in the statute relating to
such allowances. It further stated that,
... it is only when a person is found not to be a defective delinquent
on the original determination, §§ 7(a) and 9(a), or on redetermi-
79. The reason for this is likewise sound; appeal is not an evidentiary hearing,
and therefore the trial attorney could not defend, in an appellate forum, his handling
of the case. MD. ANN. COn, art. 27, § 645A(a) (1967).
80. 6 Md. App. 120, 250 A.2d 281 (1969).
81. MD. ANN. CoDs art. 31B, §§ 9(b) & 10(a) (1967).
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nation, § 10(a), that credit for time already served shall include
"such allowances (or disallowances) relating to good behavior
and/or work performed as the Board of Correction may determine
under the provisions of § 688 of Article 27 of the Code." 2
The court also rejected applicant's claim that he was denied equal
protection of the law in that the second requirement of Section 10(a)
is an "invidious discrimination" because a convict, not a defective
delinquent, is eligible for parole after one-fourth of his sentence expires.
The court held that the legislature's establishment of the classification
of defective delinquent, a medically recognized group, was constitution-
ally valid because it was founded upon pertinent and real differences."3
3. Revocation of Suspension of Sentence
Questions involving the validity of procedures utilized in hearings
at which a convicted person's probation is revoked are likely to be of
increasing concern in the future, now that the Warren Court has
digested the apparent bulk of pre-trial and in-court criminal pro-
cedure problems.
In Knight v. State,84 the court was faced with the issue of whether
the sixth amendment right to effective representation by counsel ex-
tends to such hearings. Defendant had been convicted on various
counts of false pretenses and uttering a false instrument, had been
sentenced to three concurrent two-year terms, and had had execution
of those sentences suspended in favor of a two-year probation period.
On being convicted of another crime committed during the probation
period, a hearing was held at which defendant, an indigent, was not
represented by counsel. At that hearing the suspension of execution
of sentence was revoked, and the sentence ordered to be commenced,
as of the time of the hearing. Defendant was never informed of a
right to counsel at the hearing, or that counsel would be appointed if
he was indigent. He appealed the striking of the suspension, alleging a
violation of his sixth amendment right, relying on Mempa v. Rhay.3
The court discussed the nature of such hearings in Maryland,
merely reiterating the holdings in cases such as Edwardson v. State""
and Crenshaw v. State, 7 which decided that such a hearing is not a
''criminal prosecution" within the context of the sixth amendment or
Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and that generally
the probationer is not entitled to the more rigorous protections of
criminal procedure and evidentiary safeguards as long as the hearing
is conducted reasonably and fairly. This has traditionally meant that
the probationer has no right to be advised of his right to counsel or
to have one appointed if he is indigent ". .. unless due process would
82. 6 Md. App. at 125, 250 A.2d at 284 (emphasis added).
83. See Director v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966) ; Tatlebaum v.
Pantex Mfg. Corp., 204 Md. 360, 104 A.2d 813 (1953).
84. 7 Md. App. 313, ___ A.2d __ (1969).
85. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
86. 220 Md. 82, 151 A.2d 132 (1959).
87. 222 Md. 533, 161 A.2d 669 (1960).
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be affronted, in that, for lack of counsel the probationer would be at
such a disadvantage that an ingredient of unfairness actively operated
in the process. "88
Mempa held that where the actual sentencing had been deferred
in favor of probation, a hearing at which probation is struck and a
sentence imposed is certainly a "stage of a criminal proceeding where
substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected." 9 Defendant
contended that this rule should be applied to situations such as his
own, where the sentence is imposed at trial and only the execution
of the sentence is suspended. But the Court of Special Appeals noted
that, unlike the situation in Mempa, the hearing judge "had no power
to change the sentence" imposed upon defendant." Rather, he merely
executed the sentence already imposed at trial. Thus the court rea-
soned that a hearing at which a previously imposed sentence is merely
executed is still not a "critical stage of a criminal proceeding," and
Mempa does not apply.91
It is unclear whether the court's holding was that, because the
hearing judge only executed rather than imposed the sentence, the
hearing was not a "criminal proceeding," or whether, for that reason,
the hearing was a criminal proceeding but was not a "critical stage."
If the former is the case (and, prior to Mempa, at least, it has been)
then the court's reasoning would appear to turn on a "distinction
without a difference" since regardless of whether the sentence is being
imposed or merely executed, a hearing is either a "criminal proceed-
ing" or it is not, and Mempa has held that it is. If the latter is the
reason, the decision is even more open to criticism, since there can
be little doubt that a decision as to whether to execute a previously
imposed sentence is as effectively "critical" as the earlier decision to
impose it. It would seem that sixth amendment rights should be
protected equally in both situations.
4. Inadequancy of Representation by Counsel
at the Appellate Stage
The definition of inadequacy of counsel was refined somewhat
in Scott v. Warden,92 a decision on an application for leave to appeal
the denial of a petition under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act. There the petitioner had been convicted of housebreaking and
grand larceny, and had appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
which affirmed the judgments. Defendant then requested his attorney
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Maryland Court of
Appeals, but his court-appointed counsel failed to do so.
Rule 719(b) (7) (b), which became effective prior to the Court
of Special Appeals' affirmation of the judgments, requires, in part, that
a court-appointed attorney advise his indigent client of his right to
88. 7 Md. App. at 321, __ A.2d at --. The probationer may, of course, have
the assistance of an attorney if he desires to hire one.
89. 389 U.S. at 134.
90. 7 Md. App. at 325, __ A.2d at
91. Id.
92. 6 Md. App. 200, 251 A.2d 17 (1969).
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apply for a writ of certiorari, and to assist him in the preparation of
the application if the client so desires.
The court stated flatly that ". . . the right to file a petition for
a writ of certiorari is not a constitutional right." 3 Thus the decision
as to whether the petitioner would be allowed to file a belated applica-
tion for a writ turned on whether his sixth amendment right to effec-
tive representation by counsel had been violated by the latter's failure
to file the application when requested.
The court only went so far as to state that in the given situation
such a failure would violate a petitioner's sixth amendment right, and
would thus entitled him to file a late application for the writ.94 The
court based its decision on the fact that defendant had, as he alleged,
requested such an action by his attorney, and specifically refused to
decide whether an appointed counsel's mere failure to follow Rule
719(b) (7) (b) by instructing his client as to his right to apply would
violate the sixth amendment right to representation by counsel if that
failure resulted in no application for a writ being filed.95 The state-
ment that "we note that the denial of a statutory right may, in some
circumstances, be a constitutional denial"9 " suggests that were the latter
situation to appear before the court, relief would be granted.
On balance such a decision would be sound, as is the decision in
this case. Unlike many other criminal procedure questions stemming
from constitutional guarantees, the remedy to be afforded the petitioner
is not a new trial. Rather, it is merely permission to file a belated
application for a writ of certiorari, the right to apply for which had
been his for the asking in any case, prior to the expiration of the
alloted appeal period. Hence the burden on the judicial system is small,
and a valuable aid to the convicted is preserved.
II. SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SUBSTANTIVE
NATURE OF CRIMES
A. Insanity as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution
Parker v. StateOT reaffirmed the long-standing rule that voluntary
drunkenness is not a defense to criminal prosecution. Moreover, held
the court in a long and carefully reasoned discussion, voluntary drunken-
ness may not be either a full or a partial basis for an insanity plea.
Defendant committed robbery and murder while drunk, and
pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. There was evidence that
defendant while normally sane, suffered from a chronic mental syn-
drome induced by organic brain damage, which condition, when acti-
vated by intoxication, would render him legally insane under the
93. Id. at 204, 251 A.2d at 19.
94. The application for leave to appeal was granted, and the case remanded for
an evidentiary hearing as to whether defendant had in fact asked his attorney to apply
for certiorari.
95. The court indicated that, of course, such a failure would not be prejudicial if
the application were made anyway, reasoning by analogy to the failure to advise of the
right to appeal, discussed in Slater v. Warden, 241 Md. 668, 217 A.2d 344 (1966).
96. 6 Md. App. at 204, 251 A.2d at 19.
97. 7 Md. App. 167, 254 A.2d 381 (1969).
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requisite test. Defendant argued that as long as he was legally insane,
the causative factor in the insanity was immaterial.
The requisite insanity test in Maryland is no longer the M'Naugh-
ten Rule, but rather the test prescribed by Article 59, Section 9(a) of
the Maryland Code, enacted in 1967. However, as noted by the court,
this section was of little value in determining the merit of defendant's
argument, since the only qualification it contains as to the application
of the rule is that ". . . the term 'mental disease or defect' do [sic]
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct."1
9 8
But the court went on to state that, under "the established rule
of law in this State,"99 voluntary drunkenness is no defense to prose-
cution. Then after a discussion of many authorities, the court decided
that voluntary drunkenness, by itself or in combination with other
factors not themselves sufficient to constitute insanity, will not support
an insanity plea, no matter whether or not the degree of drunkenness
is so great as to meet the applicable test of insanity. In so ruling the
court rejected defendant's argument that the cause of the insanity is
immaterial. As a corollary to this rule, the court held that if a long-
standing habit of imbibing had created a psychotic weakness in de-
fendant which, when "activated" by a drinking bout, produced insanity,
such insanity would be a defense. The distinction as recognized by a
majority of the courts in the United States is really not between tem-
porary and permanent effects of drinking, but rather between expected
and unexpected consequences, "between the direct results of drinking,
which are voluntarily sought after, and its remote and undesired conse-
quences."100 This seems to be more of a policy decision, based on the
necessity to avoid allowing criminals to intentionally counterfeit in-
sanity by drinking in order to create a built-in defense.''
In view of its rule that voluntary drunkenness cannot constitute
a basis for an insanity plea, but that a chronic psychotic condition
based upon and subsequently triggered by alcohol may, it would seem
that a chronic alcoholic, who is legally sane most of the time despite
his condition, would be allowed an insanity defense if he was forced
by the demands of his habit to drink and become intoxicated to the
point of legal insanity. The court refused to pass upon this point.
The court also decided cases involving two somewhat lesser points.
In Saul v. State,0 the court held that it was correct for the trial court
to refuse to allow defendant to utilize a psychologist as an expert wit-
ness to testify that defendant was legally insane, although the witness
was allowed to report the results of tests which he had given to the
defendant. The court reasoned that only a medical doctor should be
allowed to draw a conclusion as to defendant's sanity from the test re-
98. Id. at 174, 254 A.2d at 391, quoting, MD. ANN. CoDie art. 59, § 9(a) (1967).
99. 7 Md. App. at 174, 254 A.2d at 391.
100. Id. at 179, 254 A.2d at 388.
101. The court repeated the familiar rule that drunkenness may be great enough
to negate the required intent to commit the crime if the crime in question includes an
element of express intent rather than presumptive malice.
102. 6 Md. App. 540, 252 A.2d 282 (1969).
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sults, and that since the psychologist was not a medical doctor, he could
only present the results for the jury's determination of a conclusion.
In Sweeney v. State,' the court held that defendant was not
entitled to a bifurcated trial, first on the issue of his insanity, and then
on the issue of his guilt.
B. Assault of a Police Officer by One Resisting
an Unlawful Arrest
Halcomb v. State"°4 is significant only in that it clarified, through
a simple exercise of legal logic, the nature of the possible crimes com-
mitted when a person uses force to resist an illegal arrest. It is beyond
doubt that a person has the right, at common law, to resist an unlawful
arrest."°5 But if he uses more force than is necessary to successfully
resist, he may be prosecuted for one of the assault or murder crimes.
Defendant, in resisting an admittedly illegal arrest, shot the arrest-
ing officer in the face with the officer's revolver. He was later con-
victed of assault with intent to murder, after the trial court gave the
jury an instruction which did not properly provide for a distinction
between a killing in the heat of passion and one committed with
malice aforethought.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed. Under Davis v. State,'
one resisting an illegal arrest may be guilty of first-degree murder if
the killing was done with malice aforethought, or may be guilty of
manslaughter if the killing was done in a heat of passion produced by
the activity of resisting, or may be guilty of neither if the killing was
justified. Therefore, the court reasoned, one may be convicted of
assault with intent to murder only if he possessed the same malice
required for first-degree murder (i.e., if the assault had in fact resulted
in a killing, it would have been first-degree murder). Any violence
inflicted merely in the heat of passion could therefore be no greater
than simple assault, since the requisite intent was not present to have
made the crime first-degree murder if a killing had occurred.
Moreover, said the court, the State's argument that any assault
committed in the course of a felony is, by an extrapolation of the felony-
murder rule, an assault with intent to murder, is not reasonable or
valid.'" 7 Rather, "[t]he intent involved in the crime of assault with
intent to murder can never be implied as a matter of law, but must
always be proved as a matter of fact .. .
103. 6 Md. App. 431, 252 A.2d 9 (1969).
104. 6 Md. App. 32, 250 A.2d 119 (1969).
105. The court cited: Jenkins v. State, 232 Md. 529, 194 A.2d 618 (1963);
Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 102 A.2d 714 (1954) ; Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52,
195 A. 329 (1937) ; Jones v. State, 4 Md. App. 616, 244 A.2d 459 (1968). Id. at 41,
250 A.2d 124.
106. 204 Md. 44, 102 A.2d 816 (1954).
107. Defendant had also been convicted of robbing the officer of his pistol and
espontoon; as the court reversed this conviction for lack of a showing of animus
furandi, its decision regarding the application of the felony-murder statute is not
strictly necessary.
108. 6 Md. App. at 43, 250 A.2d at 125.
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C. Loopholes
Couture v. State'0 9 is noteworthy only in that it apparently has
created, or at least illuminated, a loophole in the Maryland embezzle-
ment statute." ° As noted by the court in its opinion, embezzlement "in
general consists of the fraudulent appropriation of personal property
by a person to whom it has been entrusted.""' But the crime in
Maryland has been defined by statute; one element of this statutory
definition is that the accused have been "a cashier, servant, agent, or
clerk to any person, or . . . a cashier, servant, agent, officer, or clerk
to any body corporate . .1.1."2 One not acting in any of these capacities
is not an embezzler under the law, according to the opinion in Couture.
Defendant had been employed by a temporary management firm,
Employer Overload Company, which firm was, in turn, operating a
new gas station owned by the Shell Oil Company under an agreement
with that company. The temporary management firm, Overload, re-
ceived the income from the station as Shell's agent and in turn de-
posited it in a bank account, the ownership of which was not in
evidence. Defendant in turn acted as the receiving agent of Overload
through his capacity as manager of the station. Thus he was an em-
ployee and agent of Overload, and not of Shell; further, the court
decided, he was not a sub-agent of Shell since the latter had never
authorized his appointment as temporary manager. Since he was
neither an employee nor agent of Shell, from whom the money was
diverted, he did not come within the "cashier, servant, agent, officer,
or clerk" description of the embezzlement statute, and thus could not be
prosecuted as an embezzler despite the fact that he had taken large sums
of money which had come into his hands as manager of the station.
The loophole created by this ruling lies in the fact that, regardless
of whether defendant committed a statutory embezzlement, his taking
was of funds entrusted to him and thus was not trespassory in nature; he
could not be prosecuted for larceny any more than for embezzlement." 3
State v. Magliano"4 is one of those interesting cases in which
a seldom used remnant of the English common law, which Maryland
adopted as her own at one point in her history, has returned to haunt
the state judicial process, enabling defendant to avoid prosecution for-
ever for a crime which he very probably committed.
One James Vincent Galliard was confined in the Baltimore City
Jail, whence he escaped, taking refuge in the home of Magliano, who
knew of the escape and nevertheless harbored him. Magliano was
indicted for being an accessory after the fact to the escape. The State
appealed the trial judge's dismissal of the case.
In Maryland, escape is a statutory felony under Article 27, Sec-
tion 139. Harboring a known escapee made a person an accessory
109. 7 Md. App. 269, 255 A.2d 84 (1969).
110. MD. ANN. CODe art. 27, § 129 (1967).
111. See League v. State, 1 Md. App. 681, 232 A.2d 828 (1967).
112. MD. ANN. CoDm art. 27, § 129 (1967).
113. Brown v. State, 236 Md. 505, 513, 204 A.2d 532, 536 (1964).
114. 7 Md. App. 286, __ A.2d __ (1969).
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after the fact at common law. As the court noted in Agresti v. State,11 5
"[a]n accessory at common law may be made a principal by statute ;,,""
however, the only accessories made principals by the escape statute,
decided the court, are those before the fact. Being an accessory after
the fact to an escape remains merely a common law crime.
Of course, an accessory's common law status does not affect his
ability to stand trial for his crime. As stated by the court, the entire
body of the English common law"17 was incorporated into Maryland
law by Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights. But a part of that
common law was the rule that an accessory to a crime could not be
convicted before conviction of the principal, for reasons then obvious.
This rule has been extinguished by statutory enactment in many juris-
dictions; in Maryland, it has not, and thus is as good a rule today
as it was in 1776.
The difficulty encountered by Magliano's prosecutor in coping
with this rule was insurmountable, due to the fact that Galliard, the
principal, had died without being convicted of the escape. The death
of the principal meant he could never be convicted; without a convic-
tion of the principal, there could never be a conviction of the accessory.
The practical effect of this decision is to preclude a conviction of any
person who is a common law accessory but is not a statutory principal,
until the principal has been convicted. Since the reason for the rule
lies in a need to have judicial determination that a crime was in fact
committed, prior to trial of any accessories to that crime, it would
seem that where a case involves multiple principals, the conviction of
one would be sufficient to allow the accessory's conviction.
115. 2 Md. App. 278, 234 A.2d 284 (1967).
116. Id. at 280, 234 A.2d at 286.
117. As opposed to English statutory law, which is incorporated only so far as
had been "found applicable" to Maryland, through use in law and equity courts, as of
July 4, 1776.
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